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Abstract 
 
After giving an introduction to the basics of transfer pricing with a focus on intangibles, this 
paper aims to establish the nature of residual profits and what needs to be considered when 
such profits are generated. It will become clear that residual profits are an economic concept 
rather than an element of tax law which is why, first, a connecting link needs to be found 
between these two disciplines. Once it has been established whether or not residual profits 
form part of the notion of income as understood in tax law, the analysis will turn to the on-
going dispute concerning the application of either the arm’s length principle or formulary 
apportionment as best method with regards to the allocation of residual profits deriving from 
intangibles. 
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 1 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background – The Necessity for Transfer Pricing Rules 
 
When entering into cross-border transactions, multinational enterprises (MNEs) can either 
choose to conduct business with third parties (independent enterprises) or their own group 
members (associated enterprises). While the prices set between companies that are in no way 
connected to each other usually are based on the rules of supply and demand, this is, however, 
not necessarily the case for companies belonging to the same group. Given the existing 
connections, be they legal or economic, associated enterprises may be tempted to price 
transactions in a manner unlike the one followed by independent companies, ultimately giving 
them advantages of one sort or another.1 
MNEs are in a position to set prices deviating from the ‘usual’ market price, simply because – 
within their group – they are not subject to market forces (i.e. supply and demand). As a 
result, an MNE can actively manipulate its tax base which has a direct effect on the corporate 
income tax it is required to pay in each of the countries it has positioned itself in.2 
MNEs are, consequently, capable of shifting profits from one country to another, thereby 
creating scenarios in which they enjoy the most fiscal advantages possible. A multinational 
group, therefore, will find itself tempted to relocate profits away from high-tax jurisdictions to 
low-tax jurisdictions.3 
 As a reaction to the on-going profit shifting, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) concerned itself with the matter and came up with 
specific guidelines for States creating their domestic transfer pricing rules. These are the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 
(TPG)4, which have been revised in course of the OECD/Group of 20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project (BEPS Project), the most recent results of which (especially with regards to 
intangibles) were published in 2015 under the title “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with 
Value Creation, Actions 8-10 – 2015 Final Reports” (Final Report).5  
 
The revision of the TPG through the BEPS Project was necessary in order to protect 
the States’ tax revenue and to prevent tax-motivated profit shifting. 6  Several States, 
consequently, started to implement provisions that could prevent the MNEs’ practice to 
                                                
1 J. Monsenego, Introduction to Transfer Pricing (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International BV, 2015), p. 3. 
2 Ibid., p. 4. 
3 T. Zinn/N. Riedel/C. Spengel, “The Increasing Importance of Transfer Pricing Regulations: A Worldwide 
Overview” (2014), vol. 42, issue 6 & 7, Intertax, p. 352. 
4 OECD (2010), OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
OECD Publishing, (OECD TPG). 
5 OECD (2015), Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 – 2015 Final Reports, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 9, 10; available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241244-en; (Final Report). 
6 T. Zinn/N. Riedel/C. Spengel (n. 3), p. 352. 
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tamper with transfer prices. In most of the cases, intra-group transactions are since tested 
against the arm’s length principle (ALP), according to which the modus operandi of the tested 
transaction has to lead to an outcome similar to what would be the case between independent 
companies interacting in comparable circumstances.7 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) as such emerged with the steadily increasing 
globalisation. The opening of international markets led to more frequent trade and direct 
foreign investment activities and MNEs started playing a bigger role in the economy. As a 
logical consequence, cross-border intra-group trade increased, subjecting MNEs to several 
(tax) jurisdictions around the world. It is needless to say that tax planners jumped at the 
opportunity to exploit the effects different tax rules have on each other, resulting in less than 
single taxation, double non-taxation or allowing for other forms of base erosion and profit 
shifting. 
Tax authorities saw themselves, as a consequence, confronted with situations in which the 
gaps – created through the application of different national tax regimes or through double tax 
treaties (DTTs) – caused income deriving from cross-border transactions to be taxed at too 
low a rate, or even not being taxed at all.8 
 
The BEPS Project, further, in its Final Report concerned itself specifically with 
transfer pricing issues, in particular with problems relating to intangibles, cost contribution 
arrangements, profit splits as well as risk and capital. 
The guidance given in the Final Report ultimately aims at ensuring that value creation and 
transfer pricing arrangements are in line with each other. In other words, the rules laid down 
in the Final Report should guarantee that operational profits deriving from certain economic 
activities be allocated to where they arose in the first place. 9  
 
In summary, transfer pricing rules have become necessary because the opening of 
international markets for multinational enterprises has led to situations in which they were 
able to shift their profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions, thereby 
achieving the best possible tax treatment for themselves.  
As is often the case, however, where a winner is found, a loser cannot be far. The tax planning 
activities of MNEs came to the detriment of those States from which profits were shifted 
away, causing a loss in their tax revenue. Not wanting to remain in a losing position, they 
fought back by implementing transfer pricing rules, which, especially through application of 
the arm’s length principle, are meant to ensure the correct pricing of transactions amongst 
associated enterprises. Where a transaction within a group would not have been concluded 
under (nearly) the same circumstances between independent companies, the tax authorities 
would now have the power to adjust the profits made between associated enterprises.10  
                                                
7 T. Zinn/N. Riedel/C. Spengel (n. 3), p. 352. 
8 OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, p. 7-10; available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en; (Action Plan). 
9 C. Panayi, “International Tax Law Following the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project” 
(2016), Bulletin for International Taxation, p. 630, 641, 642. 
10 Art 9, OECD (2015), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2014 (Full Version), OECD 
Publishing; available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239081-en; (OECD MTC). 
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In course of the BEPS Project the Final Report was published which revised the existing 
transfer pricing guidelines, especially with regards to intangibles. Its aim is to bring outcomes 
of transfer pricing arrangements in line with value creation and, thereby, to ultimately ensure 
that tax bases are not eroded. 11  
 
As will become evident throughout this paper, intangibles, especially the allocation of 
residual profits deriving therefrom, put the TP rules as applied at the moment at a test that has 
led to considerable discussions. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this paper is to point out and analyse the problems that occur when it comes to 
the allocation of residual profits deriving from intangibles.  
 
As a starting point to this analysis the paper will try to draw a connection between residual 
profits as an economic concept and tax law in order to justify the taxation of such profits in 
the first place. The origin of the link to these two disciplines will be examined in the light of 
the notion of income as an element of tax law. 
Once this connection has been drawn, the paper will establish whether or not the allocation of 
residual profits is in line with transfer pricing standards, especially the ALP. 
The issue that arises in the context of intangibles and their ability to generate residual profits 
is the question of allocating such profits amongst the contributing affiliated entities. The TPG 
suggest that in cases where no comparables can be found (which is often the case with 
intangibles) a profit split method should apply.12  
The proposal to apply a PSM, however, has led to great discussion with regards to the ALP 
which constitutes a core element of transfer pricing. In course of this analysis the paper will, 
therefore, also refer to formulary apportionment as an alternative method and discuss which, 
if any, of the presented methods is the most appropriate for the allocation of residual profits. 
 
1.3 Methods and Materials 
 
The question of how to allocate residual profits deriving from intangibles is discussed in a 
legal-dogmatic manner. This method takes an internal perspective by referring to the positive 
law as it stands. The purpose of this kind of research is to identify ways to improve the 
coherence and ensure the consistency of the legal system.13 
 
This paper is based on Art 9 of the OECD MTC in combination with several works published 
by the OECD in the course of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project. Although of non-binding 
character, these sources represent the framework and basis for national transfer pricing 
legislation, which is why this analysis refers back to them in order to take a general, rather 
                                                
11 Final Report (n. 5), p. 13. 
12 Ibid., p. 60 at 2.4. 
13 S. Douma, Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law (Kluwer 2014), p. 17, 18. 
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than a country-specific, approach to the issue at hand. It is, moreover, argued that the 
Guidelines, which constitute soft law, are “arguably more important than any “hard law” on 
transfer pricing”.14 
 
The analysis is backed up by academic literature, while reference is also made to the debates 
that the allocation of residual profits has triggered. 
 
The research made to this paper ends with fifth of June 2017. 
 
1.4 Delimitation 
 
As mentioned above, the analysis of the question at hand is based on the OECD TPG and 
takes an international approach in search for an answer on how to allocate residual profits 
deriving from intangibles. It is, therefore, to a large extent, outside the scope of this paper to 
refer to any particular national transfer pricing legislation.  
 
Since the United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries15 
(UN Manual) faces the same, or at least similar issues regarding the ALP, it does not need to 
be explicitly mentioned. It will suffice to say that the UN Manual also allows for the 
application of the profit split method or a formulaic approach, thereby stretching the ALP.16 
In that regard, it is sufficient to use the OECD TPG by way of example. 
 
This paper also does not refer to any EU-case law due to the lack thereof on specifically the 
allocation of residual profits and the application of the residual profit split method. The author 
is aware of the existence of U.S.-cases regarding these issues, but, is of the opinion that, for 
the purpose of this paper, the presented case based on OECD material will be sufficient to 
point out the difficulties arising with regards to residual profits. 
Since this paper is, furthermore, part of a law programme, accounting and economic questions 
will, where necessary, only be considered on a very basic level, although transfer pricing in 
general, and the residual profits in particular, are certainly closely connected to these subjects. 
1.5 Outline 
 
This paper is divided into two major parts. Part I is especially intended to guide readers with 
no or little experience in transfer pricing through its basics and will therefore be presented in a 
rather descriptive manner. It will, further, touch upon the special features of intangibles in a 
transfer pricing context. 
                                                
14 J. Li, “Soft Law, Hard Realities and Pragmatic Suggestions: Critiquing the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines” in W. Schön/K. Konrad, “Fundamentals of International Transfer Pricing in Law and Economics 
(Springer 2011), p. 79. 
15 UN, Department of Economic & Social Affairs (2013), United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing 
for Developing Countries. 
16 M. Koomen, “Transfer Pricing in a BEPS Era: Rethinking the Arm’s Length Principle – Part I” (2015), 
International Transfer Pricing Journal, p. 144. 
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Part II will then dive into the depths of profit allocation and will take a more critical approach 
to the topic, pointing out the problems and disputes that have arisen with regards to residual 
profits. 
 
As a starting point, the arm’s length principle will be explained, focusing on the functional 
and comparability analysis (Chapter 2). Following, the different transfer pricing methods will 
be touched upon (Chapter 3). A separate chapter will be devoted to intangibles and the 
specifics relating to them in a transfer pricing context (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 will consist of an 
example pointing out the problems of profit allocation, and thereby preparing the reader for 
the discussion at the core of this paper. Chapter 6, as the final chapter of part I, will focus on 
the profit split method.  
The core analysis of this paper will begin with a problem-orientated discussion of residual 
profits (Chapter 7) and the arm’s length principle (Chapter 8) as well as the profit split 
method (Chapter 9). Chapter 10 will present formulary apportionment as an alternative for 
profit allocation and Chapter 11 will consist of a comparison between the arm’s length 
principle and the method of formulary apportionment with the goal to establish which of the 
two is to be preferred.  
Finally, a conclusion of the foregoing analysis will be drawn. 
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PART I 
II. The Arm’s Length Principle 
 
2.1 General Remarks 
 
The fact that controlled transactions between members of an MNE can be made subject to 
atypical conditions and therefore do not necessarily follow market forces gives rise to the 
application of the arm’s length test. Should this test, after examining the controlled 
transaction, come to the conclusion that independent companies would not have entered into 
relations under the given intra-group conditions, tax administrations might be authorized to 
impose taxes not only on the profits actually generated, but also include those profits which 
the entity would have made if it had not been for any special conditions. The ALP, for that 
reason, examines first and foremost the prices set by associated enterprises, because 
mispricing is considered the most obvious means for companies to shift profits from one 
jurisdiction to another.17  
Other than preventing tax base erosion, the ALP also sets a barrier to the distortion of 
competition since it ensures, to a broad extent, equal tax treatment of associated and 
independent enterprises, making it more difficult for the former to create tax advantages for 
themselves.18  
This principle, however, is not without its shortcomings. It can be argued that MNEs and 
independent companies are not comparable, because while associated enterprises are in a 
position to pursue a common goal, not all of the transactions need necessarily benefit every 
single member of the group. Independent entities, on the other hand, are most likely to enter 
into transactions only if they are advantageous to them. As ‘single players’ they do not (have 
to) take into account anyone’s interests but their own.19 Additionally, synergy effects are not 
considered in the arm’s length test although they have an influence on a company’s income 
and, together with the lack of eligible comparables, the ALP cannot always provide for a level 
playing field between associated and independent companies.20 Some of these issues will be 
dealt with in more detail further along in this paper. 
 
Before a comparison of the controlled transaction with an independent transaction can 
be made, the scope of what is being compared needs to be established. This is done in two 
steps, beginning with a functional analysis followed by a comparability analysis. 
 
                                                
17 A. Bullen, Arm’s Length Transaction Structures – Recognizing and restructuring controlled transactions in 
transfer pricing, (The Netherlands, Volume 20, Doctoral Series IBFD – Academic Council, 2011), p. 3, 4. 
18 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 34 at 1.8. 
19 J. Monsenego (n. 1), p. 19. 
20 B. Stieber/R. Macho, „Verrechnungspreise und Fremdvergleich – Wie flexibel ist der lange Arm?“ (2012), 
Heft 9, taxlex, Manz, p. 370. 
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2.2 The Functional Analysis 
 
The functional analysis examines which role each of the involved associated enterprises plays 
in a given transaction. As a rule, the more important of a position a company obtains, the 
more it should be exposed to the benefits or negative effects of the transaction, i.e. the group 
member will enjoy (a greater part of) the profits made, or will have to carry the burden of 
occurring losses.21 
Under the ALP, the (proportional) allocation of profits is based on an analysis of the functions 
a group member performs, which risks it assumes and which assets it uses. A starting point to 
determining a group company’s involvement in a transaction is to check existing contractual 
agreements. Should it emerge, however, that the actual conduct of the parties is contrary to 
the content of the contract, when assessing the roles of each company, the Final Report 
prioritises real-life occurrence. In terms of actual conduct, control over and the ability to 
financially bear a risk are the decisive factors for determining the risk-bearing party and, 
ultimately, the entitlement to arm’s length compensation (“substance over form”).22 
 The result of the functional analysis will show how much each involved company adds 
to the value of the transaction in relation to what other group members have contributed and 
should finally lead to a clear portrayal of the transaction under examination. Further, it will 
establish how much each party has contributed to, and is involved in, the economic outcome 
of the intercompany transaction.23 
 
This analysis is only the first step towards finding an appropriate transfer price or 
correctly allocating profits or losses. The next step to figure these points out consists of a 
comparability analysis. 
 
2.3 The Comparability Analysis 
 
In order to determine whether the price set between associated enterprises reflects what would 
have been agreed upon between independent companies, a comparison between the controlled 
transaction and an uncontrolled transaction has to be made. Apart from the functional 
analysis, there are four additional factors which help to establish comparability.  
A price, accordingly, complies with the ALP if the characteristics of property or services, the 
contractual terms, economic circumstances and business strategies are comparable. The key, 
consequently, to finding a suitable comparable (i.e. a comparable transaction/company) is to 
make sure that similar circumstances between the controlled and uncontrolled business-deal 
can be found. In any case, no such comparable can be used that is found within the group. In 
other words, the comparable has to be independent from the tested party.24 
                                                
21 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 45 at 1.42, 1.45. 
22 J. Wittendorff, “At Arm’s Length – BEPS Actions 8-10: Birth of a New Arm’s-Length Principle” (2016), Tax 
Notes International, p. 332. 
23 J. Monsenego (n. 1), p. 22, 23. 
24 P. Fris/S. Gonnet, “The State of Art in Comparability for Transfer Pricing” (2010), International Transfer 
Pricing Journal, p. 99-102. 
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The comparability test can be conducted in two different ways. One is to examine 
“internal comparables”, in which case a transaction taking place between an associated and an 
independent company is compared to the purely internal business deal. The other way is to 
take a look at “external comparables”, where transactions between only unrelated entities are 
examined so as to test the prices set within a group against the ALP.25  
 
Comparability is given as long as any differences between the compared facts cannot 
materially affect the price or margin under examination or, if differences are given, as long as 
adjustments can be made in an accurate manner to eradicate the differences.26 
Should the result of the test show that the “MNE price” is not at arm’s length, national laws 
will often allow the tax authorities to adjust a mispriced transaction, thereby rectifying the 
faulty income allocation. This, however, might lead to a risk of double taxation of MNEs, 
since each State has different rules concerning income allocation.27  
To prevent double taxation, therefore, an adjustment made in one State should be equalized 
by a corresponding adjustment in the other involved State.28 
 
Without wanting to give too much away, the author cannot stress enough that a 
successful comparability analysis, or comparability for that matter, depends on the existence 
of a suitable comparable.  
To put the functioning of the ALP very bluntly, if there is nothing to compare, no price can be 
tested against it.  
 
Or can it?  
 
For now, this question can remain floating in the reader’s head.  
Instead, the paper will continue with some basics on transfer pricing methods and the 
treatment of intangibles in a transfer pricing context. 
 
III. Transfer Pricing Methods 
 
The purpose of transfer pricing methods is to establish a price that passes the arm’s length 
test. Their application intends to either determine the correct price beforehand or to test 
already set prices of intercompany transactions.29  
The five methods mentioned in the OECD TPG are the comparable uncontrolled price method 
(CUP), the resale price method, the cost plus method, the transactional net margin method 
(TNMM) and the transactional profit split method (PSM). 
                                                
25 J. Monsenego (n. 1), p. 24. 
26 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 42 at 1.33. 
27  A. Pichhadze, “The Arm’s Length Comparable in Transfer Pricing: A Search for an “Actual” or 
“Hypothetical” Transaction?” (2015), World Tax Journal, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 2, 3. 
28 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 140 at 4.32. 
29 J. Monsenego (n. 1), p. 37. 
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They can be divided into “traditional transaction methods” (CUP, resale price and cost plus) 
and “transactional profit methods” (TNMM and PSM). The OECD Guidelines, further, 
distinguish between two groups of transfer pricing methods.30 One group consists of the price-
based methods which turn to market data, margins or indicators deriving from profit levels 
(i.e. CUP, resale price, cost plus and TNMM). The other group consists of the profit-based 
method which is relied upon when the market does not provide for a direct comparable 
(PSM). The methods can be, further, split into one-sided methods (resale price, cost plus and 
TNMM) and two-sided methods (CUP and PSM). While the one-sided methods focus only on 
one of the parties to the intra-group transaction, the two-sided methods consider both 
parties.31  
 
 For the purpose of this paper and at this stage of the analysis it will suffice to mention 
that, with regards to choosing the “right” method, the OECD TPG suggest using the most 
appropriate one for the case at hand. Appropriateness is determined by reference to the 
concrete characteristics of the controlled transaction (functional analysis). Further factors 
influencing the choice of method will be the availability of sufficient information, or the 
question of whether there are sufficiently comparable transactions at all.32 
The transactional profit split method will, however, be subject to greater discussion further 
along. 
In the meantime, the treatment of intangibles for TP purposes shall be discussed in order to 
complete the picture one should have before the allocation of residual profits deriving from 
intangibles can be discussed. 
 
IV. Intangibles 
 
4.1 General Remarks 
 
Globalization, together with deregulations in various sectors, digitalization and the growing 
importance of the service sector have transformed economies, from primarily production-
based to being strongly knowledge-based. As a consequence, the use of intangibles has 
become of great importance for businesses around the world.33   
On the one hand, with the growing importance of intangibles for MNEs in mind, the question 
of ownership and income allocation became more significant, resulting in MNEs shifting 
profits in ways that have reduced their tax base in high-tax jurisdictions.34 On the other hand, 
                                                
30 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 59 at 2.1. 
31 C. Peng, “The Application of the Arm’s Length Principle to the Allocation of Joint Efficiencies within MNEs” 
(2016), International Transfer Pricing Journal, p. 383. 
32 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 59 at 2.2. 
33 M. Lagarden, “Intangibles in a Transfer Pricing Context: Where does the Road Lead?” (2014), International 
Transfer Pricing Journal, p. 331. 
34 J. Wittendorff, “Valuation of Intangibles under Income-Based Methods – Part I” (2010), International 
Transfer Pricing Journal, p. 323. 
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tax administrations had to watch how these companies created base erosion scenarios by 
“abusing” contracts, in so far as they allocated the legal ownership to a member of the group 
which did not in fact perform any functions relating to the development, enhancement, 
maintenance, protection and exploitation (DEMPE) of the intangibles.35  
The OECD’s reaction to this issue was to align transfer pricing outcomes with value creation 
rather than allowing for a separation of these two elements.36 
 
Before pointing out the mechanisms through which this is achieved when dealing with 
intangibles in a transfer pricing context, a definition of intangibles will be given. 
 
4.2 The Definition of Intangibles 
  
For transfer pricing purposes intangibles are defined as  
“something which is not a physical asset or a financial asset, which is capable 
of being owned or controlled for use in commercial activities, and whose use 
or transfer would be compensated had it occurred in a transaction between 
independent parties in comparable circumstances.”37 
 
In order to decipher this cryptic definition and paint a more vivid image of what constitutes an 
intangible, one might think, for example, of trademarks. 
The purpose of a trademark is to make an owner’s product distinguishable from others by 
giving it an exclusive name or by adding a unique logo, symbol or picture to it. The right to 
ownership of a trademark is often confirmed through registration, and enables the owner to 
keep competitors from using the trademark in a way that could cause mix-ups on the market. 
Unlike patents, trademark protection is not limited to a certain amount of time, as long as its 
registration is regularly renewed and it is used on a continuing basis. Goods or services may 
equally be registered under a trademark.38 
 
This is only one of the many items that is considered an intangible in transfer pricing. Others 
can be patents, know-how, brands etc.39 
 
4.3 The Transfer Pricing Process of Intangibles 
 
Just like any intra-company transaction, a transfer price for intangibles needs to be 
determined according to the ALP.  
In this regard, the Final Report states that, after delineating a transaction, it might be the case 
that legal ownership alone does not entitle a group member to returns achieved through the 
                                                
35 A. Hickman/M. Brown/M. Lucas, “Actions 8-10: Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation” 
(2016), International Tax Review, p. 16. 
36 Final Report (n. 5), p. 11. 
37 Ibid., p. 67 at 6.6. 
38 Ibid., p. 71 at 6.21. 
39 Ibid., p. 70, 71. 
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exploitation of intangible assets. Any associated company that performs functions of 
significant weight or assumes a high degree of economic risks while contributing its own 
assets can expect to receive an appropriate return relative to the value it adds to an intangible 
through its contributions.40 
The remuneration of the involved parties is determined by taking the following steps. 
 
4.3.1 Analysing Transactions Involving Intangibles 
 
“The framework for analysing transactions involving intangibles between associated 
enterprises requires taking the following steps [...]:”41 
 
As a first step, it is necessary to identify with specificity which intangibles are used or 
transferred. Further, an identification of certain risks of economic significance connected to 
the DEMPE functions is recommended.  
The next step requires an analysis of contractual arrangements, whereby emphasis should be 
put on determining the legal owner of the intangibles in question, and which of the associated 
enterprises assumes risks.  
A functional analysis will, additionally, identify the parties involved in the development, 
enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles in terms of performing 
functions, using assets and assuming risks.  
Once the contractual arrangements have been identified it needs to be established whether 
they are in line with the actual conduct of the parties and especially, whether the party, which 
contractually was assigned the assumption of risks, actually controls them and has the 
financial means to assume those risks.  This should ultimately lead to a fixed price for each of 
the intra-group transactions at arm’s length.42  
 
The purpose of this framework is to ensure that all group members of an MNE that 
perform functions, contribute assets and assume risks are appropriately compensated.43 In 
other words, legal ownership does not automatically mean entitlement to profits as will be 
seen in the following. 
 
4.3.2 Ownership of Intangibles 
 
“Although the legal owner of an intangible may receive the proceeds from 
exploitation of the intangible, other members of the legal owner’s MNE group may 
have performed functions, used assets, or assumed risks that are expected to 
contribute to the value of the intangible.”44 
                                                
40 Final Report (n. 5), p. 10. 
41 Ibid., p. 74 at 6.34. 
42 Ibid., p. 74, 75 at 6.34. 
43  M. Pankiv, “Post-BEPS Application of the Arm’s Length Principle to Intangible Structures” (2016), 
International Transfer Pricing Journal, p. 465. 
44 Final Report (n. 5), p. 74 at 6.32. 
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The revision of Chapter VI of the BEPS Project resulted in a new approach regarding 
ownership of intangibles. Legal Ownership is no longer the decisive, but rather the starting 
point for the allocation of profits. In cases in which contracts, or the applicable law, do not 
define a legal owner, the entity which controls decisions in connection to the exploitation of 
intangible goods, and has the power to restrict other entities from using them, will be regarded 
as the legal owner.45  
As long as the owner performs several DEMPE functions and controls them, while providing 
several assets needed (including funding), and bearing all risk associated with the 
development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles at the 
same time, is the owner entitled to keep all the anticipated returns stemming from the 
exploitation of the intangible.46  
This does not mean, however, that the entity in question has to perform all these functions 
“personally”. The legal owner can outsource some of the DEMPE functions and still be 
entitled to receiving (all) the returns, if control over the risks and the financial capacity to bear 
them remain with the legal owner. 
 
Under the newly introduced ‘DEMPE standard’, however, an associated company that creates 
value in the supply chain with regards to the development, enhancement, maintenance, 
protection and exploitation of an intangible, should be compensated for the valuable 
contributions it makes.47 
Once the question of legal and economic ownership has been answered, the returns deriving 
from the exploitation of an intangible have to be divided between the contributing entities.  
This can, as a matter of fact, turn out to be problematic as will be discussed in the following. 
 
4.3.3 Allocation of Returns 
 
“Applying the provisions of Chapters I-III to address these questions can be highly 
challenging for a number of reasons. Depending on the facts of any given case 
involving intangibles the following factors, among others, can create challenges:”48 
 
The Final Report states that returns resulting from the exploitation of an intangible, as well as 
the costs relating to intangibles are allocated based on the value-enhancing contributions each 
group member has made. The contributions are identified by analysing the functions a group 
member performed, the assets it used and the risks it assumed during the development, 
enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles.49 
  
Difficulties of allocation according to the ALP, the TP methods and the comparability 
of transactions (Chapters I-III TPG) can arise, however, if the controlled transaction involving 
                                                
45 M. Pankiv, (n. 43), p. 465. 
46 Final Report (n. 5), p. 84 at 6.71. 
47 A. Storck/R. Petruzzi/M. Pankiv/R.J.S Tavares, “Global Transfer Pricing Conference “Transfer Pricing in a 
Post-BEPS World” (2016), International Transfer Pricing Journal, p. 218. 
48 Final Report (n. 5), p. 74 at 6.33. 
49 Ibid., p. 73, 74 at 6.32. 
 13 
the intangibles were not to occur in a comparable way between independent entities or if the 
intangibles are not comparable at all.  
Problems may appear, additionally, because different group members of the MNE own and/or 
use different intangible assets.  
It is, further, difficult to assess which impact an intangible has on the overall income of the 
MNE. The fact that more than one of the associated entities might perform DEMPE functions 
can lead to complications, because these functions are performed with a high level of 
integration that cannot be found between entities which do not stand in any relation to each 
other.50 
In all these cases it is not easy to accurately delineate the contributions each of the group 
members made to the transaction. 
 
Keeping these difficulties in mind, the allocation of profits will now be presented.  
 
V. The Process of Profit Allocation 
 
5.1 General Remarks 
 
This chapter will explain the process of profit allocation amongst affiliated companies by 
means of an example involving marketing intangibles. According to the Final Report a 
marketing intangible is  
 
“An intangible [...] that relates to marketing activities, aids in the commercial 
exploitation of a product or service, and/or has an important promotional value for 
the product concerned.”51 
 
Given the specificities of each case, marketing intangibles could consist of trademarks, 
customer lists, specific data, etc.52 Their typical feature is, in any case, to further marketing 
and to increase sales of goods or services, thereby adding to the value of, for example, a 
brand.53 
 
The starting point to the presented example is the fact that through its marketing 
activities, a local distributor contributes to the value of intangibles it does not own and needs 
to be compensated for its activities in one way or another. 
 In general, and to recall what has partly already been touched upon, the extent to 
which an associated enterprise should be reimbursed for its contributions is assessed by an 
analysis of 
                                                
50 Final Report (n. 5), p. 74 at 6.33. 
51 Ibid., p. 69. 
52 Ibid., p. 69. 
53 S. Wagh, “Transfer Pricing Aspects of Marketing Intangibles: An Indian Perspective”(2015), Bulletin for 
International Taxation, p. 520. 
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• The rights and obligations deriving from legal registrations and what has been agreed 
upon between the parties; 
• The functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by each of the parties; 
• The expected value contributed by the marketer through its activities and 
• The compensation the marketer is given for his activities.54 
 
With the following case of the fully-fledged distributor, the issues presented in theory 
above will hopefully become more evident. The example will show that theory and practice 
do not harmonize as easily as one would have expected. 
 
5.2 The Case of the Fully-Fledged Distributor 
 
Assume that company A, resident in State X is the registered owner of a certain trademark 
and trade name, connected to special tables it manufactures (“T”). Due to A’s own marketing 
activities, T is known in several States and has developed great economic value in the 
respective markets.55 
Yet, T is not known and has never been introduced to the market in State Y before A decided 
to create a wholly owned subsidiary (S) in Y with the intention to establish T there.  
S is meant to act as distributor for A under a royalty-free marketing and distribution contract 
according to which S has the exclusive right to advertise and sell tables, both placing the 
trademark T on them, and using the trade name in State Y.  
The marketing and distribution agreement is long-term, giving these exclusive rights to S for 
a time period of five years with the option to prolong said agreement for another five years.  
According to the contract, development and execution are assigned to S. As a matter 
of fact, S even performs extensive marketing functions and bears marketing expenses which 
by far exceed what comparable independent companies would take upon themselves. The 
high level of these expenses can be traced back to extraordinary or more intensive functions 
that S performs in comparison to entities in comparable situations.  
S and A expect to achieve higher profit margins and higher sales through the increased 
performance by S. This also means that S contributes more extensively to the development of 
T and its establishment on the market, and, consequently, incurs greater costs and assumes 
more risks than an independent company normally would. S will, as a consequence, make 
significantly lower profit margins than enterprises that do not perform additional or more 
extensive functions.56 
 Compared to independent companies, and due to the excess functions and expenses S 
sees itself confronted with, it can be concluded that S will, in the end, not receive appropriate 
compensation through the margins it earned by selling the “T-tables”.57  
 
                                                
54 Final Report (n. 5), p. 86 at 6.77. 
55 Ibid., Example 8, p. 121, para. 20. 
56 Ibid., Example 10, p. 123, para. 31. 
57 Ibid., Example 10, p. 123, para. 33. 
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The Final Report suggests three different options58 for a transfer pricing adjustment in such 
cases.  
For the purpose of this paper, however, only the adjustment based on a residual profit split 
method will be examined. 
 
VI. The Profit Split Method 
 
6.1 General Remarks 
 
Following up to the example of the fully-fledged distributor (see above, 5.2), the facts of the 
case make it nearly impossible to find a comparable independent entity because the associated 
subsidiary performs functions and incurs costs that greatly exceed what an independent 
company would take upon itself in a comparable situation. The subsidiary is, consequently, 
not appropriately compensated given the margins earned by selling the trademarked tables do 
not cover the expenses it incurred. 
According to the OECD TPG, in situations where highly integrated activities take place, or 
more than one party makes unique and valuable contributions to the controlled transaction, it 
will be difficult to find an appropriate intangible. In such cases, the application of PSM might 
appear to be more appropriate.59 
 
Before this paper concerns itself with the attribution of profits in “incomparable” transactions, 
the notion of “residual profits” shall be explained. 
It should further be noted that, although the following analysis only mentions “profits”, losses 
are equally allocated under a PSM.60 
6.2 The Coming into Existence of Residual Profits 
 
It is not unheard for MNEs, or any companies for that matter, to seek to maximize their 
profits while also keeping their costs low. MNEs can reach this objective through cross-
border activity or through strategic organisation of their value chains leading to cost-savings. 
A further objective of MNEs is to set themselves apart from their competitors, which they 
achieve through research and development (R&D) and marketing activities aiming to develop 
and establish their brand, while optimizing their production process also adds to the overall 
success of the product. Following an individual strategy, therefore, will create a recognition 
value of the MNE which allows it to differentiate itself from its competitors in the market. Its 
activities will lead to the existence of non-routine assets, whose effect is to enable an MNE to 
create value that exceeds original investments.61 
                                                
58 Final Report (n. 5), Example 10, p. 123, para. 33. 
59 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 60 at 2.4. 
60 Ibid., p. 93 at 2.108. 
61 N. Lostumbo/R. Decker/A. Dust/R. Dadzie, “Profit Splits Post-BEPS: Quantifying an MNE’s Intangibles” 
(2015), Tax Notes International, vol. 80, no. 8, p. 709-710. 
 16 
To exemplify the above, assume that an MNE plans to introduce a new trademark in 
State A and wants to ensure that the trademark already established in State B remains in a 
leading market position. In either case, the entity (which is not the entity legally owning the 
trademark) located in the respective States is confronted with expenses relating to advertising, 
promotion and marketing (APM) of the product. Depending on the success of the APM 
performance, the trademark might lead to an increased value of the product.  
The “bonus” the trademark adds to the product is the result of the difference between the 
profits made through the exploitation of comparable “no-name” products to profits deriving 
from the “branded” product. In other words, the successfully promoted trademark will allow 
the MNE to generate additional proceeds. As a consequence, not only can all the contributing 
group members of the MNE be compensated for their routine contributions, but also will 
profits remain. These profits are the so-called residual profits.62 
 
With this example in mind, the idea behind the PSM will be presented. 
 
6.3 The Profit Split Method in Theory 
 
The PSM has the ability to consider the specificities and unique characteristics of 
“incomparable” transactions and is therefore more flexible in comparison to other TP 
methods. A profit split analysis is capable of determining arm’s length prices in circumstances 
where a division of the performance of routine and non-routine activities within an MNE is 
not clear-cut. This would, for example, be the case where unique and valuable intangibles are 
developed.63 
The transactional profit split method focuses its analysis on the profits resulting from an intra-
group transaction (as opposed to prices which is the focus of the other TP methods). Profits 
can be seen as significant indicators of the conditions under which a transaction took place. 
To put it differently, the profits derived from a specific internal transaction might turn out to 
be higher or lower if independent companies had been involved, due to the external 
transaction not being subject to special intra-group conditions.64 
6.3.1 The Modus Operandi of the PSM 
The PSM is performed in two-steps. First, the profits that should be divided amongst the 
contributing parties need to be identified. These profits are referred to as “combined profits” 
and derive from the controlled transaction the group members entered into. Once the profits 
have been evaluated, they are split based on economic considerations and allocated to the 
associated parties. Those economic considerations are built similarly to how independent 
companies would have divided the anticipated profits amongst each other under comparable 
circumstances.65 
 
                                                
62 D. Hack, „Marketing intangibles im internationalen Konzern – wer erhält daraus den Gewinn?“ (2008), 
taxlex, p. 179. 
63 M. Milewska/M. Hurtado de Mendoza “The Increasing Importance of Intangible Assets and the Rise of Profit 
Split Methods” (2010), International Transfer Pricing Journal, p. 162. 
64 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 77 at 2.57. 
65 Ibid., p. 93 at 2.108. 
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6.3.1.1 Step One: Identifying the Combined Profits 
First and foremost, the relevant transactions that should be subject to a profit split need 
to be identified, and it needs to be established whether a number of transactions, which 
all stem from different contracts, can only be evaluated together because they are so 
closely connected to each other.66 
Different accounting standards and currencies should also be considered and adjusted 
for, if they were not put on a common basis beforehand.67 
 
6.3.1.2 Step Two: Splitting the Combined Profits 
The underlying principle to splitting the profits is to estimate as accurately as possible 
how profits would have been split if independent companies had realised them.68 
Any allocation keys that are used when splitting profits should be detached from any 
TP policies and rely on objective data, meaning data received from independent 
transactions. Such information can be obtained, for example, by analysing joint-
venture agreements, collaborations, co-marketing agreements etc. concluded by 
independent entities.69 
 
 
6.3.2 Approaches for Splitting the Profits 
 
6.3.2.1 The Contribution Analysis 
This approach to splitting profits seeks to determine the relative value of a related 
entity’s contributions to the transaction. On the basis of this approach lies the 
correlation between capital that is being invested and resulting operating profits. 
A contribution analysis is especially suitable where the expenditures relating to the 
development of an intangible are constant, and are expected to be incurred throughout 
the useful life of the intangible at the same time.  
Alternatively, the contribution analysis can also be based on labour costs. Relying on 
labour costs is practical if a specific individual creates the economic value of the 
intangible.70  
A contribution analysis ultimately aims to quantitatively assess which group member 
made which contributions to the transaction, resulting in an allocation of the profits 
according to the arm’s length principle. As a result, and after applying the TP method 
most appropriate to the case at hand, a suitable transfer price is determined.71 
 
                                                
66 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 98 at 2.124 and p. 111 at 3.11. 
67 Ibid., p. 98 at 2.125. 
68 Ibid., p. 95 at 2.115. 
69 Ibid., p. 101 at 2.132 and 2.133. 
70 M. Milewska/M. Hurtado de Mendoza (n. 63), p. 163. 
71 S. Gonnet/P. Fris, “Contribution analyses under the profit split method” (2007), International Tax Review, p. 
8. 
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6.3.2.2 The Residual Profit Split Analysis 
The residual profit split analysis consists of two stages. In the first stage, the functions, 
assets and risks attributable to each of the related participants are categorized as 
routine or non-routine functions. The second stage first assigns an arm’s length return 
to the group members for the routine functions they performed. Based on an 
appropriate location key, residual profits are, subsequently, split between the 
contributing entities.72 
The TPG emphasise that the remuneration for the identified routine functions results 
from the application of either traditional transaction methods or the TNMM since it is 
likely that comparables can be found for such activities.73 
 
Coming back to the brainteaser regarding the question of whether an arm’s length test 
can be made in the absence of comparables, the PSM indicates that it is, indeed, possible.  
The application of the PSM has, exactly for this reason, caused havoc in the transfer pricing 
world, which is why Part II of this paper will now examine what the fuss is all about.  
  
                                                
72 S. Gonnet/P. Fris (n. 71), p. 163. 
73 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 97 at 2.121. 
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PART II 
VII. Residual Profits Revisited 
 
7.1 General Remarks 
 
At this point it will be necessary to establish what residual profits really are. In this regard, 
their origin and status in tax law need to be determined. Following this analysis, their effect 
on transfer pricing and tax law as a whole will be analysed. 
As stated before (see 6.2, above), residual profits are some kind of “bonus” an MNE achieves 
through its intangibles as compared to a product whose value has not been enhanced through 
“special features”. This “bonus”, however, can be put in different contexts. Residual profits 
can, for that matter, be considered an economic concept but the question is, whether they also 
have a place in tax law. This will be subject of the following study. 
 
7.2 Residual Profits as an Economic Concept 
 
On an economic level, residual income is used when evaluating the economic value of a 
business. An entity’s value is composed of its value as represented in its books including the 
prevailing value of the entirety of future residual income. 
Residual income, further, is used as a means to measure the performance of an entity. 
Residual income is, accordingly, that part of the overall income that exceeds the normal 
(expected) return when capital is invested.74 
This definition reflects the bonus as described in section 6.2, by means of which economic 
and accounting standards have found their way into transfer pricing. The question that 
remains, however, is if residual profits form part of income, in the sense that the economical 
notion of residual profits can be subsumed under tax law and its notion of taxable income. 
 
7.3 Do Residual Profits Exist as a Concept in Tax Law? 
 
To answer this question, income as such needs to be defined. This task, however, proves to be 
more difficult than expected as there is no single definition of income.  
Taking a look into the Cambridge English Dictionary, an entity’s income is defined as the 
profit it generates within a certain time-period.75  
Corporate income tax according to the OECD constitutes of the net profits of a company. 
These are, in turn, defined as the difference between the gross income and permitted 
deductions.76 
                                                
74 J. O’Hanlon/K. Peansell, “Residual Income and Value-Creation: The Missing Link” (2002), Review of 
Accounting Studies, vol. 7, p. 229. 
75 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary & Thesaurus, Cambridge University Press, 2017; available at: 
http://www.dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/income.  
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Yet another definition can be found, for example, in the Austrian Einkommensteuergesetz 
(EStG; Income Tax Law) where income is considered to be the total sum of revenues made 
less losses incurred, special expenses, extraordinary expenses and allowances.77 
Neither of these definitions and, especially the OECD and the EStG perceptions of income, 
refer to economic concepts, such as residual profits. One might ask oneself why tax residual 
profits at all then? The question must go even deeper in asking how can it be justified that an 
economic concept, which, at a first glance, has no connection to income as understood in tax 
law, still be incorporated into tax law and lead to taxation?  
The answer to these questions can only be found after analysing the notion of income in a tax 
perspective. 
 
 Under an optimal tax theory, the a taxpayer’s ability to pay will determine the income 
tax he/she has to pay based on a fair assessment of what he/she can actually pay. This theory 
relies on a benchmark taxpayer that cannot be found in real life. Therefore, income taxation 
can only be successful (or even fair) if its basis is objectively quantifiable, i.e. if it is 
measurable instead of being based on a strictly defined benchmark. The lack of flexibility 
should, however, not be understood as a free ticket to taking a pragmatic approach to the 
determination of income. Rather, compromises should be sought by modifying the (on paper) 
optimal theory in a way that leads to a functioning system.78 
 
The purpose behind imposing taxes based on the ability to pay is to reallocate 
resources in order to achieve equality and fair distribution of such resources. In this regard, 
fairness and the ability to pay are closely linked when determining the taxable income of a 
taxpayer. What is perceived as being fair is, of course, a matter of perspective and more of a 
political than a tax-related question but, as is the case with income, compromises and 
flexibility can ultimately lead to greater fairness, and with that equality,79 which is also one of 
the core principles of EU law.80 
Fairness in the context of income allocation has a vertical and a horizontal side to it. While 
vertical fairness seeks to achieve fair distribution by treating people in different income 
classes differently (i.e. application of a progressive tax rate), the horizontal dimension aims at 
ensuring that taxpayers in equal circumstances are treated equally. With that in mind, it would 
appear contrary to the concept of horizontal fairness, or equality for that matter, to exclude 
certain types of income from taxation. This would, equally, not be in line with the ability to 
pay because if some types of income are not taxed, this would allow taxpayers earning such 
income to escape taxes. Therefore, if it holds true that the ability to pay principle is able to 
reflect a fair tax system, each and every type of income has to be subject to tax.81 
                                                                                                                                                   
76 OECD (2017), Tax on corporate profits (indicator); available at: https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-on-corporate-
profits.htm.  
77 §2 Abs. 2 EStG 1988, BGBl. Nr. 400/1988 idgF. 
78 K. Holmes, The Concept of Income – A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis (IBFD Publications, Doctoral Series, 
2001), p. 9, 10. 
79 Ibid., p. 14, 16. 
80 M. Helminen, “Concepts and Basic Principles of EU Tax Law” in EU Tax Law – Direct Taxation, Online 
Books IBFD (IBFD 2016), p. 9. 
81 K. Holmes (n. 78), p. 21, 25, 26. 
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 Returning to the definition of residual profits in economics, they constitute an 
additional return and can, therefore, be considered to have “tax-income like” characteristics, 
i.e they are measurable and add to the ability to pay of a taxpayer. Since all income should be 
subject to taxation, it can, furthermore, be deduced that the economic concept of residual 
profits has found its way into the discipline of tax law and needs to be considered when 
determining the taxable income of a taxpayer.  
 
As pointed out above, fairness and equality play a big role in the allocation and 
redistribution of profits. The following chapters will, therefore, concern themselves with how 
this allocation should take place, especially with regards to tax law in its entirety and not only 
in transfer pricing as one of its sub-disciplines. 
VIII. Back to the Roots – The ALP as the Backbone of Transfer Pricing 
 
8.1 Taking a Step Back – Why do We Need Transfer Pricing Legislation at All? 
 
Originally, the intent of TP legislation was to prevent tax avoidance structures and to ensure 
that a taxpayer’s ability to pay was not artificially distorted. Income, for that matter, is used as 
a reliable indicator of a person’s tax paying power. At the same time, through calculated 
transfer pricing practices, income could easily be shifted amongst jurisdictions, effectively 
avoiding taxation. MNEs in particular, were able to abusively circumvent taxation being 
internationally present and not subject to market forces. TP legislation, consequently, was 
introduced to put a halt to tax avoidance and to ensure that each taxpayer carries the burden of 
taxation according to his actual ability to pay.82 
 It should be noted, however, that the OECD TPG explicitly do not intend their 
suggestions to be rules of anti-avoidance, but that they are capable of being used in that 
context.83 The original perception of TP rules has, furthermore, changed towards the question 
of fair income allocation.84 
Be that as it may, a connection between TP rules and tax avoidance is undeniable. 
 
Based on Brauner’s statement that “the arm’s length standard is the heart, spirit and 
foundation of the current international transfer pricing regime”85 and that the ALP remains 
the prevailing and, supposedly, most appropriate method to ensure the correct allocation of 
income among different jurisdictions,86 the ALP will be examined more closely, especially in 
connection with intangibles.  
 
                                                
82 L.E. Schoueri, “Arm’s Length: Beyond the Guidelines of the OECD” (2015), Bulletin for International 
Taxation, p. 690. 
83 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 31 at 1.2. 
84 L.E. Schoueri (n. 82), p. 691. 
85 Y. Brauner, “Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes” 
(2008), Virginia Tax Review, vol. 28, p. 96. 
86 L.E. Schoueri (n. 82), p. 691. 
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8.2 The Arm’s Length Principle Revisited 
 
Art 9 OECD MTC states that 
 
 “1. Where 
 
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in 
the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State, or 
b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, 
control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise 
of the other Contracting State, 
 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly”.87 
 
Reading between the lines of this provision one will find that it encloses a separate entity 
approach and the ALP as underlying principles.88 
 
The ALP itself is used as a valuation standard in pricing matters involving associated 
enterprises, whereby it builds on comparability of the controlled and uncontrolled transaction. 
Application of this principle should, ideally, lead to a business environment in which shifting 
of income, as well as the erosion of tax bases and double taxation are prevented.89 
 
Whether this is the case, will be dealt with later on in this paper. But first, the purpose 
behind the ALP shall be considered. 
 
8.2.1 The Idea behind the Arm’s Length Principle 
 
In order to ensure that affiliated and independent companies are treated in an equal manner, 
the ALP refers to market prices as a reliable means for comparing the situations of either type 
of company and to establish tax neutrality between them. The ALP, therefore, precludes 
MNEs from mispricing intra-group transactions and guarantees equal tax treatment of entities, 
irrespective of whether they are part of a group or stand for themselves. By preventing 
                                                
87 OECD MTC (n. 10), Art 9. 
88 OECD MTC Commentary, Commentary on Art 9, para 2. 
89 J. Wittendorff, “The Arm’s-Length Principle and Fair Value: Identical Twins or Just Close Relatives? (2011), 
p. 225, 227. 
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mispricing of intra-group transactions, this principle also ensures equality amongst States with 
regards to the correct allocation of taxable income and the protection of their tax revenue.90  
Narrowing the ALP down to its core, the principle of equality (hidden behind the 
principle of ability to pay) reveals itself. Equality in a TP context can be achieved where the 
use of a defined proxy establishes, based on a certain criterion, that taxpayers are 
comparable.91  
 
 But what is comparability, really? 
 
8.2.2 Comparability – Reality, Fiction or Non-existent? 
 
Equality necessarily presupposes comparability meaning that equality between taxpayers can 
only be assessed and confirmed if facts and circumstances can be found allowing for a useful 
comparison to be made.  
Market income (the proxy), for example, can be used as a comparable with which the ability 
to pay of different taxpayers can be determined. This, however, holds only true for 
independent transactions. In transactions between associated enterprises, profits merely 
represent the outcome of trade negotiations within the group. It is exactly these cases which 
require the application of the arm’s length test, as it holds the potential to blow the cover of 
intra-group prices and establish the price under which the transaction should have actually 
taken place, i.e. the market price. In an optimal world, the conversion, by means of the arm’s 
length test, of surreal prices to market prices leads to fulfilment of the principle of equality.92 
This, however, entails a fictional element, in the sense that controlled transactions are 
treated as if they had occurred under market conditions, and as such not considering the actual 
prices involved in the transaction, but arm’s length prices.93 The fiction under the ALP goes 
so far as to treat the different group members as independent, stand-alone entities. Hence, the 
allocation of profits among the different jurisdictions follows the separate entity approach.94 
Fiction does not, however, mean that any pricing scenario can be used. The ALP is 
dependent on comparability, which presupposes that intra-group transactions need to be 
identifiable. Additionally, there must be a corresponding comparable transaction on the 
market in which independent companies are involved, in order to test the transfer price 
against the arm’s length principle.95 
The application of the ALP proves to be difficult, as a matter of fact, where intangibles are 
involved, mostly because of the lack of comparables and the high level of integration found 
within MNEs.96 
                                                
90  X. Ditz, „Die Grenzen des Fremdvergleichs – Zugleich ein Plädoyer für ein Festhalten am 
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92 L.E. Schoueri (n.82), p. 696. 
93 Ibid., p. 697. 
94 E. Baistrocchi, “The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Global Proposal for Simplification” (2005-2006), Tax 
Lawyer, vol. 59, no. 4, p. 944. 
95 X. Ditz (n. 90), p. 117. 
96 Final Report, (n. 5), p. 74 at 6.33. 
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Considering the ALP is supposedly the backbone of a successful transfer pricing analysis, it 
will not come as a surprise that critics have raised their voices against its application, and 
have come up with alternatives that do not rely on comparables.  
The objections to the ALP and other possible methods will be subject to the remainder of this 
paper. 
 
8.3 The Flaws of the Arm’s Length Principle 
 
8.3.1 The Inherent Flaw of the ALP 
 
It is undisputed amongst scholars, be it proponents or opponents of the principle, that the ALP 
has its flaws. The criticism is based on a wide range of arguments. One critique focuses on the 
impossibility of dividing the international tax base, as a consequence of the failure to define 
the rationale of the ALP through feasible case law.97 
Another critical approach to the ALP argues that one might have to deal with cases in which 
comparables factually cannot exist. As an example, value deriving from common control, as a 
feature of MNEs, but by definition not of independent companies can never be tested against 
market conditions. Furthermore, there might be cases in which comparables are theoretically 
available, but the result of the comparison would lead to such a wide range of possible prices 
as to call the result of the arm’s length test into question.98 
The ALP, lastly, is questioned with regards to its effectiveness in the sense that, absent 
comparables, the arm’s length test creates inconsistent prices in its attempt to define a 
common concept of the principle.99 
 
 All of these critiques relate to the application of the ALP itself, stigmatising it as 
“inherently flawed”. In this sense, it is said to not mirror actual market conditions, i.e. 
economic reality, because the integrative character of MNEs might lead to synergy effects 
that cannot be taken into account under the ALP.100 The Final Report acknowledges this 
problem by stating that comparability issues may arise in such cases. It further states that the 
benefits of deliberately constructed synergy effects should be divided between the 
contributing group-members, but does not give any specific guidance on how this should be 
done.101 
 
Going into further detail on synergy effects is beyond the scope of this paper, and 
therefore the analysis of this particular topic will end here. A short conclusion on the inherent 
flaw of the ALP stemming from issues connected to group-synergies will, nevertheless, be 
given at this point. 
                                                
97 E.Baistrocchi (n. 94), p. 646, 951. 
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Due to MNEs being by nature spread around the world, and deriving benefits from certain 
structures allowed by such international presence, they often choose to keep as many 
transactions as possible within the group instead of exposing them to market conditions. In 
this way, they create advantages for themselves that independent entities cannot reach, the 
effect of which is what is generally understood to be the inherent flaw of the ALP. As 
Brauner puts it, the ALP is “attempting to compare the incomparable”102 in its comparison 
between independent and compared transactions.103 
 
A second category of criticism of the ALP does not question the ALP itself but sees 
problems in its application. This will be discussed below, especially with reference to the 
PSM. 
 
8.3.2 The Illusion of Comparability at the Core of the ALP 
 
It cannot be said often enough that comparability is a major factor of a transfer pricing 
analysis. The ALP is constructed in such a way as to ensure that transactions between related 
companies occur under the same circumstances as would be the case if the parties were 
independent. According to some scholars, this assumption, however, only exists in an optimal 
transfer pricing world.104 They claim that  
 
 “[...] the problems with the current system do not derive from rules at its periphery, 
but instead from a fallacy that lies at the system’s central core: namely, the belief that 
transactions among unrelated parties can be found and that they can be used as meaningful 
benchmarks for tax compliance and enforcement”.105 
 
The claimed fallacy has its origin in the markets in which MNEs operate which, in turn, 
generate TP issues, because of the unlikelihood of finding eligible comparables on these 
markets.106  
As a reaction to the lack of comparables, the use of profit split methods has become 
increasingly more important and, consequently, the application of the ALP has been 
questioned even more because it suddenly allowed an income allocation based on – what 
might be considered – a formulary approach.107 
Depending on whether one interprets the ALP in a stricter or a broader sense, it can either 
contain only those TP methods that rely on the use of comparables or can also include 
methods that do not compare transactions but only work towards a justifiable result, i.e. a 
result that would also be achieved in independent transactions.108 
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As mentioned before, regarding the choice of the correct TP method, the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines ask for the most appropriate method applicable to the facts and circumstances at 
hand.109  
With this guidance in mind, and the fact that profit split methods do not rely on comparables, 
it can be argued that“the redefinition of the ALS 110  has been completed” 111  because 
comparability no longer lies at the core of the ALP.112 
 
In the following chapter, the PSM will be analysed in the light of the foregoing critical 
approach to the ALP. 
 
IX. The Residual Profit Split Method Revisited113 
 
9.1 A Short Recap of the PSM 
 
As mentioned before, the OECD TPG suggest using the PSM for transactions in which either 
of the involved parties makes contributions of a unique character or of high value.114 In order 
to allocate income deriving from, for example, the exploitation of intangibles, the combined 
profits are allocated in two steps. In a first step routine contributions are compensated for at 
arm’s length after applying one of the traditional TP methods or the TNMM. Remaining 
profits, i.e. residual profits, are then divided between the affiliated companies based on certain 
allocation keys.115 
As noted above, the critical point is how to determine the proportion to which the residual 
profits should be split based on the relative contributions each party has made to the 
transaction.116 
 
 The second step of the residual profit allocation method has been the subject of 
significant recent debate leading the OECD to take further action which, as of today, has 
resulted in the issuing of a public discussion draft concerning profit splits.117 
9.2 Is the PSM Really Based on the ALP? 
 
According to the TPG, yes.  
                                                
109 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 59 at 2.2. 
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114 OECD TPG (n. 4), p. 60 at 2.4. 
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They consider profit as relevant indicator, proving whether or not a controlled transaction has 
been mispriced.118 This is, of course, done by way of comparison between the intra-group 
transaction and an independent transaction. Since the comparison, however, does not have to 
be based on prices, profits can also be used and, just like that, the PSM is (all of a sudden) 
within the scope of the ALP.119 
The Guidelines even go so far as to allow the application of the PSM where no comparables 
can be found or allow reliance on internal data.120 
The interpretation of the ALP (and comparability) in such a broad sense infers that the TPG 
accept the use of certain allocation keys which is, in essence, what formulary apportionment 
(see below) does. At the same time, the TPG explicitly state that the PSM differs from 
formulary apportionment in so far as the allocation keys are to be determined on a case-by-
case basis, therefore keeping the PSM within the scope of the ALP.121  
The PSM also differs from formulary methods in so far that, under the PSM, allocation 
concerns the profits from a single, controlled transaction, whereas formulary allocation 
includes the entirety of profits that the MNE has generated as a whole.122 
 
 Critics of the ALP like to interpret the application of the PSM a little differently.  
Avi-Yonah, for example, states that the PSM (and the TNMM) deviates from the traditional 
conception of comparability under the ALP. It can, therefore, be argued that the PSM is not 
based on the ALP. He goes even further by saying that if comparables are no longer a 
precondition in the application of the ALP then it cannot be said that any other method not 
relying on comparables is not in line with the ALP.123 
It is, further, argued that the ALP is superficial in so far as it applies the PSM (amongst 
others) “under the umbrella of the arm’s-length principle” 124  and that the OECD, by 
overlooking the requirement of comparability in an arm’s length analysis, has actually moved 
closer to profit allocation based on formulary apportionment.125  
In that regard, and because it is nearly impossible to determine where comparability 
(in its broad sense) under the ALP ends and formulary apportionment begins, it is argued that 
these two methods should no longer be seen as two extremes in transfer pricing, but rather as 
elements to a range of methods, reaching from the comparable uncontrolled price method to 
fixed formulas.126 
 
 Given the arguments for and against the PSM being based on the ALP, and the 
conclusion that one cannot definitely deem the allocation of residual profits under the PSM to 
be contrary to Art 9 of the OECD Guidelines, the statement that the “arm’s length principle is 
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now slowly but surely being relegated to the back seat”127 of transfer pricing should be 
viewed as inaccurate. Nevertheless, the question arises about which other options are 
available to allocate residual income in a fair manner. 
 
 The formulary apportionment method will be subsequently presented as an alternative 
to the ALP, before a conclusion will be drawn on which method might be the most 
appropriate – if there is one. 
 
X. Formulary Apportionment 
 
10.1 General Remarks 
 
Formulary apportionment methods come in many different shapes and sizes. In the U.S., for 
example, global income is apportioned under a combined, unitary regime, whereas the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposed by the European Commission 
takes a multi-factor approach. Under this approach, the entire income of EU resident group-
entities is proportionally allocated based on fractions of sales (1/3), assets (1/3), payroll (1/6) 
and headcount (1/6).128 FA might as well be based solely on sales, as Avi-Yonah and Clausing 
argue.129 Some scholars differentiate between routine and residual profits130 and others argue 
for a compromise between an ALP and FA approach.131 
For the purpose of this paper, the differences between these approaches are not relevant, and 
will therefore not be examined in detail. It is, instead, sufficient to present the general 
principles of FA. 
 
10.2 The Concept of Formulary Apportionment 
 
Contrary to the TP methods mentioned in the TPG, formulary apportionment (FA) does not 
allocate profits according to the ALP. Instead, FA allocates profits by means of a 
predetermined formula based on factors like location of sales, property or payroll. These 
factors do not necessarily have to be of same weight in the formula. Nor need all of the 
factors be included. This method is, consequently, contrary to Art 9 of the OECD MTC.132 
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The application of FA is conducted in three steps. The first step consists in 
determining the group members (subsidiaries and branches) that represent the MNE in its 
entirety. The following step accumulates the globally made profits of each of the subsidiaries 
and branches. The global profit is then, in a last step, allocated to each of the group members 
according to a certain formula.133 
FA therefore does not operate on a single-entity approach, as the ALP does, but accumulates 
all group members under the MNE, and treats the MNE as a whole as the taxpayer.134 In other 
words, the existence of several entities within the MNE is ignored, to the effect that the profits 
made by the group are treated as if a single, non-affiliated entity had generated them.135 
 
 Establishing an FA system, however, has two shortcomings from the outset. First, the 
definition of the “unitary business” appears to be problematic, since the perception regarding 
which of the affiliated entities actually is part of the unitary business varies amongst the 
States.136 
Second, and this is one of the major arguments against FA, a common formula, i.e. which 
factors the formula should include, would need to be agreed upon amongst the States. 137 The 
difficulty in finding consensus on the formula is obvious: each State will want to include only 
those elements that are advantageous for itself and they will not all be the same.138 
 
 The foregoing chapter on the PSM and this chapter on FA gave a short overview on 
the problems each of these methods face.  
The next chapter will proceed to present arguments for and against each of these methods and 
try to establish which is the preferable one.  
Even if the analysis comes to the conclusion that neither of the methods is preferable to the 
other, a decision still has to be made. This eventuality will also be given attention to in the 
following chapter. 
XI. The Final Show Down – FA v. ALP 
 
11.1 General Remarks 
 
As the ALP is currently the predominant method of profit allocation, the “final show down” 
will begin with arguments in favour of FA since, if it wants to prevail, it will have to 
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convincingly stand its ground against the already established ALP. It will then be the ALP’s 
turn to rebut any arguments that could justify its replacement in transfer pricing. 
 
11.2 Round 1 – FA on the Rise 
 
11.2.1 Synergies and Comparability no Longer Matter 
 
As mentioned above, the ALP is not capable of (fully) taking synergy effects into account 
(see 8.3.1, above). As FA methods do not rely on a comparison of transactions but only focus 
on the overall made profits, they indirectly take account of internal value-chains without 
explicitly considering (or comparing) the transactions happening within a group.139 
  
With regards to intangibles, the fact is that comparables are nearly impossible to find. 
The lack of suitable comparables is a result of the MNEs’ preference to enter into transactions 
with related parties which, in turn, decreases the number of potentially comparable 
independent transactions. In other words, the transactions between affiliated companies are 
utterly distinct from external transactions and can therefore not be compared with each other. 
In this regard, FA seems to represent a suitable alternative since it does not require 
comparables.140 
 
11.2.2 FA is no More Arbitrary than the ALP and Ensures State Revenues 
 
FA is often criticised for being arbitrary, because the factors used in the formula can only 
approximately allocate profits to the jurisdictions in which activities are performed. As a 
result, relying on an average allocation (deriving from the application of the formula) of 
profits is contrary to profits being taxed where they are generated, i.e. in the source 
jurisdiction.141 
Proponents of the FA admit that this method is arbitrary, but argue that it is no more arbitrary 
than the ALP, which relies on fictions by referring to market transactions that do not reflect 
how MNEs actually conduct intra-group transactions.  
Contrary to the ALP, however, FA methods are more predictable when it comes to generating 
revenues, because contractual arrangements of MNEs are less likely to have an effect on a 
formula and are therefore not as easy to tamper with.142 FA would even decrease the MNEs’ 
incentive to shift profits among jurisdictions because it focuses on world wide income 
anyway. In that regard, it would make no difference where income is “physically” present, 
and the respective States’ revenue would be saved.143 
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11.2.3 FA is Simpler and Less Costly than the ALP 
 
Under an FA-regime it would no longer be necessary to ascribe certain income to certain 
jurisdictions which, in turn, eliminates compliance burdens and costs. All that needs to be 
done is to determine the unitary business, and to then apply the formula for profit allocation.  
The application of the formula also makes extensive documentation of transactions 
obsolete, which will ultimately lead to cost-savings for the companies. 144 The costs MNEs 
incur are both of public and private nature and can be traced back to the ALP, in so far as 
MNEs consult lawyers, economists and accountants in ensuring they do not misprice intra-
group transactions.145 
 
11.3 Round 2 – The ALP Strikes Back 
 
11.3.1 The ALP and Transfer Pricing as Part of a Bigger Picture 
 
While it is true that the ALP cannot consider synergy effects and has its limits as regards 
comparability one must not forget that the ALP, and transfer pricing as such, are part of a 
bigger picture, namely (international) tax law.  
Within the EU it is, additionally, subject to the fundamental principles of EU law amongst 
which the principle of equality can be found.146  
As already mentioned, the ALP intends to create equality between dependent and independent 
companies. 147 It does so by comparing market prices to “MNE prices”, to ensure that MNEs 
cannot obtain any tax advantages, in the sense that the positions of the single group-entities on 
the market cannot effectively be manipulated. 148  
Generally speaking, TP legislation has the purpose of  
 
“re-establishing equality among taxpayers by allocating income according to their 
ability to pay, irrespective of their power to influence the prices of controlled 
transactions”.149 
 
Ability to pay is a corner-stone principle of tax law150 and stands in close relation to the 
principle of equality.151 Equality, subsequently, is established by comparison of similar 
circumstances. 152 
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This is exactly where the argument that FA gets along without the search for comparables 
(see 11.2.1, above) gets crushed. It might be true that for TP purposes this supposed strength 
of FA appears to be practical, but in the wider context of international tax law FA methods 
cannot be accepted as they completely disregard the “ability to pay” principle as one of the 
guiding principles of tax law.153 
 
In that regard, the ALP also fits better with the tax law’s concept of income as 
established above in the discussion of whether residual profits actually need to be considered 
with regards to income taxation. 
 
 In terms of synergies, attention should be drawn to the economic ramifications of 
applying FA methods. If internal transactions are taken into account, and the overall profits 
are distributed between various jurisdictions, profits and losses are not considered in the 
States in which the economic activity occurs. This fact is not just another piece of evidence 
that FA ignores fundamental principles, but also implies that FA is arbitrary. 154 
While the ALP is also arbitrary to some extent155, it is an effective tool in allocating income to 
jurisdictions, rather than only to the various members of the group, thereby protecting 
national tax bases.156  
Formulary Apportionment, on the other hand, uses formulas detached from any “market 
reality”, which is against the rationale of TP.157 
 
11.3.2 FA is Simpler and Less Costly than the ALP 
 
The arguments in favour of FA mentioned above (see 11.2.3) cannot be denied.  
 
 The conclusion that must be drawn from the foregoing analysis, however, is that in the 
big picture of tax law, the application of the ALP appears to be more justified, since it is 
based on market prices which, in the end, ensure equality by applying international tax norms 
in a similar manner to both intra-group and unrelated transactions.158 
 
11.4 What About Intangibles? 
 
The attentive reader will realise during the weighing of the pros and cons of both the ALP and 
FA, intangibles were not mentioned. This is simply because neither of the methods can give a 
satisfactory answer on how to allocate residual profits deriving from intangibles. This shall, 
however, not be the final conclusion to this paper.  
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It has already been established that both the ALP and FA are somewhat arbitrary. What FA 
falls short of is that its formulas generally do not include intangibles. Risks are, furthermore, 
not considered in formulaic approaches. In contrast, both of these factors are of considerable 
weight to the BEPS project and transfer pricing as such.159  
In that regard, FA is an easier applicable method but might lead to a distorted reflection of 
how much income was generated in each State, not least because it simply ignores the 
problems connected with valuating intangibles.160 
Even in cases in which intangibles are included into the formulas using costs as well as sales 
factors of intangibles in order to determine how much profit they contribute to a business, the 
difficulty to allocate them to the right jurisdiction remains.161 
 
 Relying on the residual profit split method, similarly, has not led to satisfying results; 
especially considering the effect it has on the ALP as a basic principle of transfer pricing.  
The OECD is aware of the problems the PSM has caused lately, and has gone as far as to 
admit that further guidance will be necessary on the when and how of applying the PSM.162 
As of today, the OECD has issued a revised guidance on profit splits, in the form of a public 
discussion draft, in which it seeks clarification on the application of the PSM in general and 
searches for answers to particular questions.163 
 
Since the OECD refuses to accept FA as an alternative164 to the transfer pricing 
methods it suggests and any attempt to replace the ALP by FA would, without doubt, bring 
with it, as Avi-Yonah puts it, a “complicated process of trial and error”165 it might be 
reasonable, for now, to stick with the transfer pricing system as it stands.  
This seems even more reasonable under the light of the consequences a change would have if 
consensus on a formula will ever be met. A major factor to consider is the impact a change 
would have on double tax conventions, which are based on the ALP. Double taxation, for 
example, will be an inescapable consequence.166  
 
 Having said that, the final part of the analysis will focus on the Discussion Draft and 
the possible improvements it might add to the TPG in terms of the profit split method. 
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11.5 The Discussion Draft on Profit Splits 
 
11.5.1 The PSM as Most Appropriate Method 
 
In figuring out whether or not the PSM is most suitable for the case at hand, focus should be 
put on the economically significant risks associated with the controlled transaction. Should it 
emerge that the parties concerned share such risks, the PSM can be considered as the most 
appropriate method. Note that the risks do not have to be of the same kind, as long as they are 
in close connection to each other.167 
In that regard, it is important to differentiate between economically significant risks that relate 
to a specific controlled transaction and such risks that are related to the entity as such. The 
Discussion Draft clarifies that a PSM can only be applied where economically significant 
risks associated with the controlled transaction are concerned.168 
 
 Under these conditions, a limit is set to the circumstances under which the PSM might 
be the most appropriate method and, thereby, the risk of overusing it has been diminished.169 
 
11.5.2 Value Chain Analysis 
 
The Discussion Draft aims to establish the conditions under which the application of the PSM 
is actually the most appropriate method. In the course of this guidance a new subsection 
entitled “value chain analyses” is introduced.170 The value chain analysis is used as a means to 
accurately delineate the controlled transaction and should help to establish whether or not the 
PSM should be applied to the case at hand. The Draft explicitly mentions, in that regard, that 
the mere fact that an MNE conducts its business based on a value chain does not 
automatically imply that the application of PSM is justified.171 
 
The Discussion Draft clearly tries to limit the application of the PSM to specific 
circumstances, in order to rebut the assumption that formulary apportionment might be an 
applicable allocation method, or, for that matter, that the PSM is a form of FA. In that sense, 
the value chain analysis is meant to assist in accurately delineating a transaction, instead of 
calling for the application of a PSM just because a value chain was identified.172 
 
11.5.3 Limitation of the PSM to Specific Circumstances 
 
 The Discussion Draft, further, clarifies that a PSM might constitute the most 
appropriate method only in cases in which the activities performed by the parties are highly 
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integrated and in situations in which more than one group member makes valuable and unique 
contributions.173 
An operation qualifies as being highly integrated where the functions performed, 
assets used and risks assumed by one party are so closely connected to those of another party 
that they cannot accurately be separated from each other.174 
In terms of integration, sequential and parallel integration can be distinguished. A PSM will 
most likely only be appropriate, as a matter of fact, in cases of parallel integration, because 
this kind of integration does not produce the possibility of finding reliable comparables as 
different parties add value to intangibles in the same stage of the “production process”. The 
delineation of the transaction might then reveal that all the parties assume a significant 
amount of economical risks, making a split of profits the best applicable method.175 
 As far as unique and valuable contributions are concerned, the Discussion Draft 
clarifies that such cases would encompass contributions that are not comparable to those 
made by independent entities in similar circumstances, and whose use will be key in 
generating benefits of an economic sort.176 At the same time, it stresses that the fact that no 
suitable comparables can be found does not mean that the PSM is the most appropriate 
method. Instead, it leans towards favouring adjustments and interpretation in cases where the 
risk assumption between the parties is not shared in the sense of being “economically 
significant”.177 
 
 This suggestion could be considered as putting less weight on the comparability-factor 
in situations where one of the parties assumes a low level of risks. Furthermore, it might also 
be seen as implying that, by interpreting inexact but comparable pieces of information, the 
absence of comparables can be overlooked. The Discussion Draft justifies this solution by 
stating that, although the use of inexact comparables will probably not create satisfying 
results, they are still more likely to lead to an arm’s length outcome compared to the result 
produced by the PSM.178 
 
11.5.4 Improvements Achieved Through the Discussion Draft 
 
The guidance given in the Discussion Draft hints towards the arm’s length principle still being 
the benchmark for transfer pricing. The PSM can, however, no longer be seen as the go-to 
method for the valuation of intangibles and, through the clarifications made with regards to 
the application of the PSM, this method now seems to be more in line with the ALP,179 both 
because the Discussion Draft shaped the PSM towards a method that takes into account all of 
the facts and circumstances of a given transaction and because it is aimed at analysing the 
commercial and financial connections between the parties on a case by case basis. The use of 
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a value chain analysis and functional analysis (as element of the ALP) also imply that the 
PSM accords to the ALP.180 
 The Discussion Draft, however, does not solve all outstanding issues. Uncertainties 
might remain with regards to the scope of “unique and valuable” intangibles, or on how 
“economically significant risks” are defined when assessing whether risk assumption is 
economically significant.181 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper had as its purpose the examination of the difficulties arising from the allocation of 
residual profits deriving from intangibles. Therefore, in the course of the analysis basics of 
transfer pricing and the special considerations to be made with regards to intangibles were 
presented. The result of this basic introduction was that comparability lies at the heart of the 
ALP, but that comparability appears to be scarce in transactions involving intangibles. The 
lack of suitable of comparables stems from the unique character that intangibles have and 
that, given that they add considerable value to MNEs, intangibles are kept within the group to 
create market advantages. 
Before an analysis of which method should be applied when allocating profits could be made, 
it had to be established that, although residual profits are of purely economic nature, they still 
have a place in tax law as they constitute something that has been realised and can therefore 
be subsumised under the concept of income. 
It was then pointed out that, absent comparables, the profits split method has established itself 
as the go-to means to allocate profits amongst the group-members participating in the 
controlled transaction. This caused, however, significant controversy, since it has been 
claimed that the PSM stretched, or even ignored the ALP, in so far as it does not rely on 
comparables and therefore rather resembles formulary apportionment than a method 
compatible with the arm’s length principle; or even Art 9 of the OECD MTC more generally. 
Proponents of FA took this opportunity to promote the formulaic approach as a better method 
to allocate income amongst the different jurisdictions. With its one-entity approach and 
predetermined formulas, applied to the overall profit, FA, however, is contrary to the TP 
system as we know it at the moment.  
The OCED is, nevertheless, aware of the flaws the ALP brings with itself, especially when it 
comes to the allocation of residual profits deriving from intangibles, and dedicates 
considerable efforts towards providing further guidance on how this topic should be dealt 
with. 
The Discussion Draft issued in 2016, is the latest piece of (not yet accepted) guidance on how, 
and especially when, profit split methods should be applicable. The purpose of this guidance 
is to determine (and limit) the application of the PSM. In doing so, it focuses on the accurate 
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delineation of the controlled transaction, by introducing the value chain analysis as a 
supplementary tool to the functional analysis. Further, the notion of economically significant 
risks is described with more precision, to the effect that the PSM can only be considered as 
most appropriate method where the concerned parties assume the relevant risks to an equal 
extent. 
In clarifying and adding these points, the Discussion Draft emphasises that the PSM adheres 
to the ALP and cannot be considered as a formulary method. This is especially so, because the 
PSM is applied on a case by case basis, allowing it to consider the special conditions of each 
transaction. Further, although the mode of its application is determined ex ante, it does not 
apply a one-fits-all fixed formula, as FA does. 
All in all, it has to be concluded that the ALP is still to be seen as the preferred method of 
profit allocation as it fits better with the overall picture of international tax law. 
The ALP (in its “Discussion Draft version”), however, cannot be seen as the solution to all the 
problems of (residual) profit allocation. Especially with regards to intangibles, it remains 
difficult to definitely allocate and valuate them in a way that would allow for profits to be 
taxed where they actually arise. The author is in serious doubt on whether this can ever be 
achieved but, after having engaged herself with the allocation of residual profits deriving from 
intangibles, is of the opinion that the ALP should, at least for now, remain as the benchmark 
for any transfer pricing analysis.  
At the same time, the author is of the opinion that the allocation of residual profits deriving 
from intangibles as proposed by the Discussion Draft, still has its flaws and will certainly 
keep the discussion between proponents of the ALP and FA very lively. However, just as with 
finding the “optimal” income tax base, flexibility and the willingness to engage into 
compromises seems the right path to finding better solutions, which is why the author cannot 
take a definite position towards supporting either the ALP or FA. 
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